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1 Introduction
On 29 November 2004, the United States-based Center for Constitutional Rights1 
and four Iraqi individuals2 lay a charge with the German federal prosecutor4 at the 
German federal court for criminal matters5 against the (then) United States secre-
tary of defence and ten other individuals of the United States military and security 
apparatus with the allegation that they were responsible for the prisoner abuses in 
the United States-run Iraqi prison in Abu Ghraib, which took place in 2003 and 
2004.6
* Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Johannesburg.
1 For more information on the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and its present projects, see 
http://www.ccr-ny.org (03-08-2007).
2 The number of plaintiffs on whose behalf the first criminal charge was filed was later extended to 
18. 
 This article discusses the two criminal complaints against the former United States secretary of 
state Donald Rumsfeld and others in Germany. The German criminal charge “Strafanzeige gegen 
Donald Rumsfeld” of Nov 2004, its dismissal in Feb 2005, the appeal in March 2005 and subsequent 
dismissal and the recent, second criminal charge of Dec 2006 are referred to as the Rumsfeld case. 
The (English) docket of the case can be retrieved from the Center of Constitutional Rights (CCR) 
homepage at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp (30-07-2007).
4 The German federal prosecutor “Der Generalbundesanwalt am Bundesgerichtshof” is the highest 
German prosecuting authority and can be compared with the national director of public prosecu-
tions. Cf http://www.gba.bund.de (30-07-2007) for more information.
5 The “Bundesgerichtshof” (BGH) is situated in Karlsruhe and is the highest judicial body for crimi-
nal and civil matters in Germany; see §§ 130 (1), 123 of the “Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz” (GVG), the 
German Judicial Act. Its findings are final with the exception of cases where a breach of the German 
constitution or other international human and civil rights is claimed. In these cases the decision of 
the German federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and/or the respective interna-
tional judicial organs as eg the European court of human rights in Strasbourg may be sought.
6 The confidential Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th military Police Brigade, the so-called 
“Taguba” report, which investigated torture and other war crimes allegedly committed by United 
States military personnel assigned to guard duty in detention facilities, found that United States 
army soldiers had committed “egregious acts and grave breaches of international law”. The report 
can be retrieved at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html. For more information on 
the United States military’s use of coercive methods, see the Amnesty International press release 
“United States: pattern of brutality and cruelty – war crimes at Abu Ghraib” AI Index: AMR 
51/077/2004 (Public) News Service no 118 of 7-05-2004 http://www.amnesty.org (22-07-2007) and 
Human Rights Watch “GIs against torture” of 13-03-2005 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/14/
afghan10320.htm (30-05-2007). The reverberations of these incidents were experienced for a long 
time: see eg CNN.com “More images of abuse at Abu Ghraib–Australian TV airs new photos, videos 
from 2003 scandal”, retrievable at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/15/abughraib.
photos (15-02-2006). The United States closed the facility as a direct consequence of the negative 
publicity and handed it over to the Iraqi authorities, see Die Welt, 11-04-2006, 5.
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The criminal charge utilized the newly introduced German Code of Crimes against 
International Law of 20027, which grants German penal courts, at least in theory, 
universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes and other grave breaches of 
international criminal law.8
The German federal prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge with a decision on 
10 February 20059 and found that the criminal prosecution of the accused by Ger-
many would lead to an infringement of the international principles of subsidiarity 
and non-intervention in the affairs of foreign states (comity) due to the fact that the 
requirements for a supplementary German criminal prosecution were not fulfilled.10 
Consequently, he ended all criminal investigations.
Counsel for the plaintiffs lodged an appeal against this dismissal with a peti-
tion for a court decision on 10 March 2005. This petition was also unsuccessful 
and eventually dismissed as inadmissible by the higher regional court of Baden-
Wurttemberg in Stuttgart.11 Another criminal charge12 was filed against the former 
secretary of defence Rumsfeld (who resigned on 8 November 2006) and 13 other 
individuals on behalf of 44 individuals and organizations on 14 November 2006. 
This new criminal charge alleged the commission of war crimes and acts of torture 
by the United States in its detention facilities in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. The accused in this case were not only state and military officers, as was the 
case in the first complaint, but also former government lawyers for their culpability 
for the actions of their government.
The German federal prosecutor dismissed this criminal charge, citing similar 
considerations as in his February 2005 decision, namely Germany’s obligation to 
respect principles of state comity and the complementarity of domestic criminal 
jurisdiction. The Rumsfeld case serves as another example of the so far unsuccessful 
judicial implementation of the German Code of Crimes against International Law1 
of 2002. It furthermore demonstrates how Realpolitik14can affect the judiciary (and 
politics) of an otherwise sovereign state in respect of the exercise of international 
criminal justice. This latest futile attempt to establish individual criminal account-
ability of state officials (former and still serving) raises additional legal questions 
which will be discussed in this article.
7 The German Code of Crimes against International Law is the German “Völkerstrafgesetzbuch” 
(VStGB) of 30-06-2002, published in BGBl I 2254; see 2003 International Legal Materials 995 for an 
English version with commentary. For an electronic version of the German version, see the homep-
age of the Max-Plank Gesellschaft http://www.mpg.de (20-06-2007).
8 See s 1 of the German code of crimes against international law, which confers universal jurisdiction 
to German criminal courts under the principle of “Weltrechtsprinzip”, regardless of the location of 
the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator. 
9 Decision of the federal attorney general of 10-02-2005, to cease further criminal investigations 
– http://www. ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp (03-08-2007). Cf the official statement press release 10-02-
2005 http://www. generalbundesanwalt.de/de/voelker.php (30-10-2007).
10 Decision (n 9), 2, thus referring to the complementary nature of any German criminal prosecution of 
international crimes.
11 The Oberlandesgericht is comparable to the high court in South Africa.
12 Press release of 27-04-2007 “Kein Ermittlungsverfahren wegen der angezeigten Vorfälle in 
Abu Ghraib/Irak und Guantanamo/ Kuba” http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/prnt/showpress.
php?newsid=273 (20-06-2007). 
1 So far, there have been 28 unsuccessfully lodged charges with the attorney general. This information 
was received from the press information office – presse@generalbundesanwalt.de.
14 Referring to a situation where the diplomatic, political and strategic interests of one state affect its 
freedom to deal with its inter- and intra-state affairs. 
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2 The facts of the criminal charges
2.1 The first charge of 2004
The criminal charge of the eighteen plaintiffs accused United States secretary of 
defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and ten other high-ranking representatives of the United 
States military and security apparatus of complicity in war crimes and acts of tor-
ture, committed in the notorious United States military prison of Abu Ghraib, Iraq, 
by subordinates in 2002 and 2003. These crimes were committed by military per-
sonnel of the United States’ 800th military police brigade and the 205th military 
intelligence brigade and probably by other members of the various civil United 
States intelligence branches. The alleged crimes took place in Abu Ghraib between 
September 15, 2003 and January 8, 2004. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been 
subjected to various acts of torture and physical maltreatment, sexual humiliation 
and even rape, sleep and food deprivation.
Criminal responsibility of the accused as the military and civil superiors of the 
military personnel committing the actual crimes was based on sections 4, 8 13 and 
14 of the Code of Crimes against International Law – namely the omission to su-
pervise subordinates as stipulated in section 13 of the code, the omission to report a 
crime committed by a subordinate as stipulated in section 14 of the code and directly 
from their position as military and civil superiors under section 4 of the code.15
One of the explicit objectives of the criminal charge was to end the impunity of 
military and civil superiors of the soldiers and actual perpetrators.16
2.2 The second charge of 2006
The second criminal charge of December 2006, amended in March 2007, was filed 
again against the (now resigned) secretary of state, Rumsfeld, and thirteen other 
high-ranking military and state officials on behalf of 44 individuals and (non-gov-
ernmental) organizations.17 It partly repeats the allegations of the first criminal 
charge in respect of the events in connection with the Abu Ghraib detention facility, 
Iraq, but differs from the original complaint by extending the criminal responsibil-
ity of the accused to acts of alleged torture committed in the Guantanamo Bay de-
tention facility in Cuba. Another significant difference of this criminal charge is the 
fact that it includes senior United States governmental lawyers for their role in ad-
vising the present United States administration on the legal guidelines on the treat-
ment of detainees in United States detention facilities.18 The complaint regarded 
these actions as acts of aiding and abetting the crime of torture.
15 Decision (n 9) 2.
16 Seven low-ranking army reservists were charged with the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The official Penta-
gon claim is that the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib were aberrations of individual soldiers, 
see eg Human Rights Watch “US: Abu Ghraib trials only ‘a first step’ – those who ordered or 
condoned abuses must also be prosecuted” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/05/usint9945.htm 
(6-01-2005). 
17 The text of this charge can be retrieved from the decision (n 9). 
18 International criminal adjudication does not provide for many cases in which legal advisors were 
successfully convicted for their complicity in the commission of international crimes. See the 
Altstötter case (aka Justice case) before the United States military tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, 
judgment of 4-12-1947, cited in Lauterpacht Annual Digest and Reports of Public International 
Law Cases: Year 1947 (1951) 278-289 for an example for the prosecution of members of the German 
judiciary.
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It was alleged that these actions constituted crimes under the above-cited sections 
of the Code of Crimes against International Law and, in addition, under sections 
211, 223, 239, 6.9 of the German penal code in connection with the provisions of the 
United Nations Torture Convention and article 129 of the Geneva Convention on the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III).
 A brief excursus on the criminality of torture under international law19
Acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are 
regarded today as a true jus cogens norm of international (criminal) law. The inter-
national crime of torture became globally criminalized under the United Nations 
Torture Convention of 1984.20 Prior to that, certain acts of inhumane treatment had 
already developed customary law status under international law.21
The protection from torture through the Torture Convention has become a true 
means of human rights protection. Article 1 explicitly establishes the connection of 
torture to the existence of official acts (or omissions) of a state, thus qualifying the 
offence as an exemplary “state” crime.22 The (international) crime of torture has 
therefore become an independent crime whose scope exceeds the sole criminalizing 
of certain “inhumane acts” as otherwise listed in connection with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.23
Interesting in this context is the fact that torture was not incorporated into the 
Rome statute of the international criminal court in The Hague as a fifth of the so-
called “core crimes” of international criminal law.24 Considering the nature of the 
criminalizing of torture as a safeguard against (domestic) state torture in the first 
place, one can assume that the fear of possible interference in the internal affairs of 
a state led to its exclusion from the Rome statute.
The Torture Convention has already been used for the purpose of prosecuting 
gross human rights perpetrators. In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Mag-
istrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International intervening) (No 3)25 Pin-
ochet as a former head of state was found to be responsible for his alleged role in the 
commission of serious international crimes (such as torture) under the provisions 
19 Cf Bachmann Liability for Gross Human Rights Violations: From Criminal to Civil Remedies (2006 
thesis UJ), part B for more information on the international crime of torture and its adjudication 
before domestic and international courts.
20 International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 1984, 1465 UNTS 113-114.
21 Ratner and Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law – Beyond the 
Nuremberg Legacy (2001) 117. This qualification can be further based on the observation that the 
crime of torture with its two elements, namely that of torture strictu sensu and other acts qualifying 
as inhumane and cruel, has found its way into every major instrument of international criminal law 
as an inherent element of other international crimes. 
22 “any act […] inflicted by or at the instigation […] of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity […], a 1 of the Torture Convention.” 
23 Cf a 6(b) and (c) of the charter of the international military tribunal of 1946 (IMT), a 2(a) and 5(f) of 
the statute of the international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), a 3(f) and 4(a) of the statute 
of the international court for Rwanda (ICTR), a 2 and 3 of the statute of the special court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) and lastly, a 7 s 1(f) and 8 s 2(a)(ii) of the statute of the international criminal court. 
24 The term “core crimes” refers to serious international crimes and human rights violations such as 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of aggression, torture and 
(state-sponsored) terrorism, cf eg Murphy “Civil liability for the commission of international crimes 
as an alternative to criminal prosecution” in 1999 Harvard Human Rights Journal 6. Such crimes 
impose as jus cogens violations on states an erga omnes duty of aut dedere aut judicare.
25 1999 2 All ER 97 (HL). 
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of the Torture Convention and the British Criminal Justice Act of 1988. Subsequent 
extradition proceedings came to an end, however, when Pinochet was eventually 
found to be unfit to stand trial because of his poor health. The home secretary de-
cided on 2 March 2000 that Pinochet was to be sent back to Chile.
Today torture has become, as Kaufmann J stated in his groundbreaking decision 
in Filartiga v Pena-Irala,26 prohibited by the “law of nations” and its perpetrators 
regarded, “like the pirate and slave trader before him, as the enemy of all mankind 
or hostis generis”.27
4 The use of coercive methods by the intelligence community
Counterintelligence organizations worldwide use coercive methods to interrogate 
“resistant” sources on a daily basis. The war on terror has seen an increased use 
of coercive interrogation methods by Western counterintelligence28 since 11 Sep-
tember.29 The infamous aberrations of some United States servicemen and women, 
which became known to the broader public in the Abu Ghraib scandal, might hide 
the fact that the use of such coercive methods is deemed to be essential for gaining 
the necessary (intelligence) knowledge of the organization and the modus operandi 
of the terror organization Al Qaeda. Major terror plots in Europe were foiled be-
cause of the use of such methods.
Counterintelligence interrogation consists of a psychological approach (which is 
not unlike the interrogative approach in a domestic criminal interrogation) and a 
more physical, coercive approach.30 The former manipulates the suspect psycho-
logically in order to achieve the interrogative objective, while the latter approach 
coerces the suspect to respond with a feeling of debility, dependency and dread.1 
The approaches used by the various branches of the intelligence community may 
differ in intensity and approach: the choice of approach is hereby determined by 
the interrogator, his “rules of engagement” and the urgency of the particular situa-
tion. In the so-called “ticking bomb” scenario,32 where the suspect might carry vital 
26 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). The case concerned civil liability for gross human rights violations such 
as torture. Cf for a more detailed outlook on civil liability, Bachmann “Human rights litigation 
against corporations” 2007 TSAR 292-308.
27 See the Filartiga case (n 26) 890. 
28 See Mackey and Miller The Interrogator’s War – Inside the Secret War against Al Qaeda (2004) for 
an insightful description of the United States military’s counterintelligence interrogation of enemy 
combatants in the Afghan combat theatre.
29 The term refers to the infamous attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by Arab terror-
ists of the Al-Qaeda network, which took place on 11-09-2001, in which some 3000 people lost their 
lives.
30 The United States central intelligence agency’s (CIA) confidential KUBARK manual differentiates 
between so-called coercive and non-coercive counterintelligence approaches see eg “Die Folter-
ungen von Abu Ghraib folgten einem Handbuch des CIA” http://www.uni-kassel.defb5/frieden/
themen/Menschenrechte/folter-mccoy.html (10-06-2006) and McCoy “Torture at Abu Ghraib 
followed CIA’s manual” Boston Globe 14-052004 http:// globalresearch .ca/arts/MCC406A.html 
(30-06-2007).
1 Coercive methods used by the intelligence organs start with “softer” methods such as sleep depriva-
tion, psychological threats (including the use of dogs), stress positions such as standing or kneeling 
for certain periods of time and increase in intensity to actual acts of physical abuse qualifying as 
physical torture.
32 This term refers to life or death scenarios where the suspect might probably carry vital information 
needed to stop an impending bomb threat. The use of “moderate physical pressure” in ticking-bomb 
situations was authorized in Israel in 1987 by the Landau commission. See Human Rights Watch, 
“The twisted logic of torture” http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/6.htm (30-06-2007).
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information on an impending terrorist bomb plot, resorting to coercion as an inter-
rogative approach is more likely.
Distinguishing which technique qualifies as “coercive”, but is still permissible 
under the secret rules of engagement of the counterintelligence interrogator, and 
which technique already constitutes an act of (psychological and/ or physical) tor-
ture is difficult and probably only academic in nature. An alternative, more prag-
matic approach would regard all interrogative means and actions using coercion as a 
violation of article 1 of the Torture Convention of 1984 with the possibility of a later 
justification in cases of the above-mentioned “ticking bomb” scenarios.34
5 The German Code of Crimes against International Law of 2002
In order to understand the legal context of the criminal charge within the German 
legal framework and its jurisprudence it is important to reflect on the way Germany 
prosecuted international crimes prior to and after the introduction of the Code of 
Crimes against International Law.35
5.1 The prosecution of international crimes before German criminal courts
In June 2002 Germany introduced the Code of Crimes against International Law,36 
which establishes universal jurisdiction of German criminal courts for the punish-
ment of serious crimes under international law.
5.2  Criminal prosecutions of serious international crimes in Germany before the 
introduction of the Code of Crimes against International Law
Before the introduction of the new code, the prosecution of international crimes 
before German courts faced various legal difficulties in respect of subject matter 
jurisdiction and applicability of law. This notwithstanding, in 2001 German courts 
successfully tried Bosnian Serbs for crimes of genocide and war crimes committed 
during the Yugoslav conflict of 1991 to 1995.7Criminal jurisdiction was established 
either under section 6(1) of the German penal code38 for the crime of genocide or, 
alternatively, under section 6(9) of the German penal code for war crimes as of-
fences prosecutable on the basis of a binding treaty. Consequently, German courts 
in the latter case applied the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) and the Protocol Additional to 
 Coercion might, however, lead to inaccurate or false information by the suspect who will even fabri-
cate information in order to avoid further torture, see Mackey and Miller (n 28) 31-32.
34 Such a differentiation would be unlawful under the law of criminal procedure of most democratic 
states. Cf the fruit of a poisonous tree doctrine of the United States criminal procedure. The present 
complaint of Markus Gäfgen against Germany before the European court of human rights concerns 
a recent case of the use of psychological torture by German law enforcement officers in connection 
with such a life or death scenario – application no 22978/05, decision of 10-04-2007. 
35 Cf Bachmann (n 19) part B ch 2.
36 (n 7). 
7 See Ambos and Wirth “Genocide and war crimes in the former Yugoslavia before German criminal 
courts” 2001 Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung und zum Humanitären Völkerrecht 771 for 
a discussion of these six judgments. 
38 Strafgesetzbuch, the German domestic penal code.
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the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).9
One of the thresholds with respect to the exercise of German criminal jurisdiction 
had always been the requirement of establishing the so-called “legitimising link” 
between the offence and Germany in order to prevent a violation of the principle of 
sovereign equality in international law.40 The existence requirement was confirmed 
by the German federal supreme court41 in respect of the crime of genocide but left 
open with respect to war crimes.42
An additional restriction for the prosecution of international crimes lies in the 
scope of the applicable law. While the crime of genocide was prosecutable under 
section 220a of the German Penal Code, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
were not codified in the German Penal Code and as a consequence had to be pros-
ecuted as ordinary crimes of murder and manslaughter under sections 211 and 212 
of the German Penal Code.43
5.3  Criminal prosecution of international crimes under the new Code of Crimes 
against International Law
Such difficulties for an effective criminal prosecution of international crimes, however, 
should belong to the past after the introduction of the new code. Criminal jurisdiction 
of German courts under German general criminal law and the special provisions of 
the new code can be established for the prosecution of serious international crimes 
without requiring any further link to Germany.44 The Code of Crimes against Interna-
tional Law criminalizes genocide and crimes against humanity as serious violations 
of human rights law45 and war crimes as violations of humanitarian law.46 Of particu-
lar importance in the context of the criminal complaint is the criminality of the omis-
sion to report a crime by persons who are under an explicit duty to act.47
6 The criminal proceedings
6.1 The German federal prosecutor’s decision to dismiss the first criminal charge
The German federal prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge on the grounds (a) 
that the prosecution of the accused crimes before a German criminal court would 
9 Ambos and Wirth (n 37) 777 on the applicability of “humanitarian law” on the crimes of genocide 
and/or war crimes.
40 Such a link exists eg in the presence of the accused person in Germany.
41 Bundesgerichtshof (n 5).
42 BGH decision of 13-02-1994 in Tadic BGs 100/94 reported in 1994 Neue Juristische Woche 232 for 
the crime of genocide and BGH judgment of 30-03-1999 in Jorgic 3 StR 215/98 in BGHSt 45,65 for 
war crimes. For a further discussion of the link requirement, see Ambos and Wirth (n 37) 778-783.
43 This has to be seen against the background that while Germany had ratified the four Geneve conven-
tions with the two additional protocols, the application of the criminal sanctions of the grave breaches 
system could not take place because of an absence of the necessary domestic implementing legisla-
tion. Subsequent implementation was also hindered by the non-retroactivity limitation as stipulated 
by a 103(2) of the German constitution (GG).
44 See the German code (n 7) s 1 which reads “serious criminal offences […] even when the offence was 
committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany”.
45 s 6 and 7.
46 s 8-12, covering the whole range of humanitarian law including the provisions of the Geneva Conven-
tions I-IV and the two Additional Protocols I and II.
47 s 14(1) imposes on military and civilian commanders the duty to “draw the attention” of the respec-
tive disciplinary organs to offences committed by their subordinates.
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have been unlawful because the United States of America had primary jurisdiction 
over the accused and (b) the prerequisites of a German (subsidiary) prosecution 
under section 153(f) of the code of criminal procedure48 were not fulfilled in that 
case.
The discussion and evaluation of the question, whether a so-called initial sus-
picion (Anfangsverdacht)49 for the existence of a crime existed, consequently did 
not fall under the scope of the German federal prosecutor’s criminal investigation. 
Because of the invoking of this procedural limitation, further deliberations on the 
existence and applicability of possible bars to a criminal prosecution in Germany 
(such as immunity) were not necessary.
This decision limits the universality of German criminal proceedings for inter-
national crimes under the new Code of Crimes against International Law to cases 
whose prosecution would apparently not violate the principles of subsidiarity and 
non-intervention in the affairs of foreign states. German criminal legislation takes 
these principles into account under section 153(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which allows the prosecution of international crimes only in a subsidiary context, 
comparable to the complementary jurisdiction of the international criminal court at 
The Hague under article 17 of the statute of the international criminal court.50
The German federal prosecutor stated further that the primary forum for the 
prosecution of international crimes remained the forum of the state whose citizens 
have either committed the crime or were the victims of the crime (thus referring to 
the active and passive personality principles as two of the principles51 of interna-
tional law conferring criminal jurisdiction on domestic courts and accounting for 
the particular interest of the home state of the perpetrator, respectively victim, to 
prosecute the crime). Otherwise the criminal jurisdiction of international criminal 
courts such as the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia52 or the 
new international criminal court in The Hague would have automatic primacy in 
such cases. Therefore, German criminal courts could only exercise their jurisdic-
tion over United States citizens in order to close a possible “impunity gap” for the 
above-mentioned core crimes of international law, thus following the principle of 
jurisdictional complementarity in the context of universal jurisdiction.
The German federal prosecutor found that the United States criminal jurisdiction 
was the primary and only jurisdiction for the prosecution of the alleged crimes and 
stated that53
48 The Strafprozeßordnung (StPO) is the German code of criminal procedure.
49 The so-called Anfangsverdacht is a prerequisite for any German criminal prosecution and can be 
translated as the existence of an initial criminal suspicion as an indicator for the existence of a crime. 
This is a requirement for any criminal investigation – see s 153(2) StPO.
50 See preamble and a 17 of the statute of the international criminal court: The efficiency of the inter-
national criminal court to prosecute crimes under these limitations may resemble an eventual 
“Lackmus test” of its later efficiency and eventual credibility.
51 These principles are the territoriality principle, the nationality principle, the passive national-
ity principle, the protective principle, and finally the universality principle. See eg “The Harvard 
research draft convention on jurisdiction with respect to crime” 1935 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 443; Shaw International Law (2003) 597; Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 16 
et seq; Ratner and Abrams (n 21) 161.
52 The international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 was estab-
lished by security council resolution 827 of 25-05-1993.
53 See Decision (n 9) 4.
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(1) the United States of America as the state whose citizens were accused of the 
crimes in question had primary criminal jurisdiction over the alleged crimes 
at all times due to the active personality principle;
(2) the alleged crimes did not take place in Germany as the locus crimini;54
(3) German citizens were neither perpetrators nor victims of the alleged crimes. 
The attorney-general as the competent prosecuting agency was authorized to 
withdraw charges in such a case according to section 153(c)(1) and section 
153(f)(2)(1) and (2) of the German Strafprozeßordnung on the grounds that 
the requirements neither of the active nor passive personality principle were 
met;
(4) the fact that military disciplinary action (court martials) was being taken 
against some of the accused served as evidence that “there are no indications 
that the authorities and courts of the United States of America are refrain-
ing, or would refrain, from penal measures”, albeit to adjudicate the alleged 
crimes itself. Therefore, there was no need for establishing the complemen-
tary jurisdiction of Germany.55
Counsel of the plaintiffs appealed the decision to dismiss the criminal charge with a 
petition for a court hearing on 10 March 2005. This petition was lodged at first with 
the higher regional court of Karlsruhe, which was found not to be competent to hear 
the case due to the fact that the higher regional court of Stuttgart had both factual 
and regional jurisdiction over the petition of the claimants.56
6.2  The decision of the higher regional court of Stuttgart to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
petition for a court decision
On 14 July 2005, counsel for the plaintiffs lodged a petition with the higher regional 
court of Stuttgart with the objective of obtaining a court order which would force 
the German federal prosecutor to resume the prosecution of the case, a procedure 
that is known as “indictment enforcement procedure”.57
The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their complaint by the German federal 
prosecutor on the grounds that he had misinterpreted the prerequisites for the dis-
missal of investigation procedures or criminal charge matters under section 153(f) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the case resembled an example where 
the German federal prosecutor would have had no discretion not to initiate criminal 
investigations. They claimed that the German federal prosecutor’s dismissal there-
fore constituted a violation of the legality principle of German criminal procedural 
law.58
54 as stipulated under s 9 of the German penal code.
55 See s 153(f )(2)(4) StPO.
56 The regional jurisdiction of the higher regional court of Stuttgart derives from the fact that at least 
some of the named accused are residing within its district – see s 120(1)(8) GVG.
57 This procedure is called Klageerzwingungsverfahren and resembles a criminal review procedure 
before a criminal court with the objective to review the prior dismissal of a criminal case. This 
procedure has to be initiated by the defendants themselves; see s 172 GVG.
58 The so-called legality principle subjects the initiation of criminal proceedings to the prerequisites of 
s 153(ff) StPO and serves as a safeguard of the legality of criminal justice within the broader context 
of the rule of law.
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The petitioners also requested the referral of certain legal aspects of the decision 
to the German federal constitutional court59 under article 100(1) of the German con-
stitution of 194960 to review the constitutionality of the decision.
This petition was unsuccessful and the higher regional court dismissed it as inad-
missible on 13 September 2005.61 The court confirmed the findings of the German 
federal prosecutor in his dismissal of 14 July 2005. The German federal prosecutor’s 
decision not to proceed with the criminal proceedings was lawful under section 
153(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to the fact that the exercise of the 
German federal prosecutor’s discretion to dismiss the case or not was lawful and no 
misinterpretation of the legal prerequisites on his side was apparent.62
The court further dismissed the request for a referral to the constitutional court 
under article 100(1) of the German constitution on the grounds that section 153(f) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself was constitutional and furthermore that 
there were no indications of any violation of international law by the decision of the 
German federal prosecutor.63
6.3  The German federal prosecutor’s decision to dismiss the second criminal 
complaint
The new charge of 14 November 2006 accounts for the resignation of Rumsfeld as 
secretary of defence on 8 November 2006, thus removing the bar of jurisdictional 
immunity for the former state minister. It also includes in the group of defendants 
governmental lawyers who allegedly aided and abetted the United States govern-
ment in the commission of international crimes such as torture.64
The German federal prosecutor dismissed the updated criminal charge as well 
and followed the considerations made in his decision of February 2005 stressing 
Germany’s obligation to respect the principles of state comity and the complemen-
tarity of domestic criminal jurisdiction.65 This decision confirmed his earlier view 
that the United States of America had the sole and primary duty to adjudicate –and 
remedy – any allegations of torture committed by its forces and/or citizens. The 
German federal prosecutor found no reason to assume that Germany had a legal 
duty or even right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction.66
The decision did not comment on the removal of Rumsfeld’s procedural immu-
nity after his resignation or on the criminality of the alleged acts of aiding and abet-
ting (state) torture by his legal advisors through their legal advice.
59 The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German federal constitutional court, situated in Karlsruhe is the 
German counterpart to the South African constitutional court.
60 The Grundgesetz (GG) allows the German federal constitutional court to review the constitutional-
ity of acts of the judiciary in its a 100 I GG.
61 See decision of the OLG Stuttgart of 13-09-2005 http://www.rav.de/download/OLG_ Stuttgart_
BU/30922005.pdf (30-06-2007).
62 5 and 9.
63 10.
64 Cf the summary of the American society of international law (ASIL) “ASIL insight German 
criminal complaint against Donald Rumsfeld and others” http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/12/
insights061214.html (20-06-2007). 
65 Press release (n 12).
66 (n 12) 4.
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7 Conclusion
At a first glance, the Rumsfeld case seems to demonstrate to what extent Realpolitik 
may affect the quest for justice. The latter was hereby heavily affected by politi-
cal and diplomatic questions and considerations by the United States secretary of 
state’s threat to abstain from participating in the global security conference in Mu-
nich, Germany, in November 2005 because the criminal proceedings were still in 
progress.67 Conveniently and in order to avoid any diplomatic annoyance, the case 
was dismissed precisely one day before the commencement of this event.
The Rumsfeld case did not establish the necessary “Grundsatzentscheidung”68 on 
the applicability of the Code of Crimes against International Law for future cases. 
The federal prosecutor missed the opportunity to add some jurisprudence to the 
otherwise hardly developed case law on the commission of international crimes 
through the means of legal aiding and abetting.69
It only resembled an example where German penal procedural law led to the 
eventual dismissal on the grounds of the principle of the subsidiarity of the criminal 
prosecution of international crimes before German criminal courts.
The outcome of the Rumsfeld case explicitly acknowledged the fact that the 
present United States administration does not cover up incidents of criminal mis-
conduct of its military personnel but prosecutes such crimes in a satisfying (at least 
for the German prosecution) fashion. Recent examples from the ongoing anti-ter-
ror “Operation Iraqi Freedom” document illustrate the determination of the United 
States military leadership to stamp out any misconduct which would undermine 
and jeopardize the overall war effort of the allies (which is to counter the present 
threat of global Islamist extremism).70 The most recent development in that regard 
is George Bush’s presidential decree of 20 July 2007 which considerably limits the 
possibilities of coercion and other “stressful” interrogation techniques.71
The Rumsfeld case could have provided the opportunity to test the practical value 
of the Code of Crimes against International Law and its judicial application for the 
prosecution of international crimes at the domestic German level. To miss such 
a chance is unfortunate, considering the fact that the prosecution of international 
crimes before domestic courts has faced some stagnation since the outcomes in the 
Pinochet72 and Yerodia7 cases (as the more prominent examples of domestic adjudi-
67 This annual event of global security actors in Munich would have been negatively affected by such 
a decision by Rumsfeld.
68 judicial precedent.
69 See the Altstötter case (aka Justice case) before the United States military tribunal sitting at Nurem-
berg 4-12-1947 (n 18).
70 See CNN com “6 Marines charged with assaulting Iraqi civilians – three face murder, kidnapping 
charges in separate case” 3-08-2006 http://edition.cnn.com/2006/LAW/08/03/hamdaniya/index.
html (10-05-2007) for an overview of alleged United States war crimes in Iraq. 
71 See “Executive order: interpretation of the Geneva Conventions common article 3 as applied to a 
program of detention and interrogation operated by the central intelligence agency” http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2007/07/20070720-4.html (30-07-2007).
72 See the Pinochet case – (n 25). The court held that there was no immunity for Pinochet as a former 
non-incumbent head of state for the alleged crimes of torture and that therefore the extradition 
process could be resumed. 
7 In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium) 14-02-2002, General List, no 121 http://icj-cij.org (30-06-2007) the international court of 
justice found in essence that the issuing of the arrest warrant “constituted violations of a legal obliga-
tion” of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo under international law and that 
“Belgium failed to respect the (full) immunity from criminal jurisdiction […] that Yerodia enjoyed 
as an incumbent foreign Minister” ibid par 78(1) and (2).
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cations of international crimes and their domestic and international reverberations). 
It will be interesting to see how the concept of international justice for serious inter-
national crimes develops in future and what its implementation will look like.
SAMEVATTING
DIE KRIMINELE AANKLAG TEEN DONALD RUMSFELD – DIE VERVOLGING VOOR 
DUITSE HOWE VAN VERANTWOORDELIKES VIR DIE BEWEERDE MISHANDELING 
VAN GEVANGENES DEUR DIE VSA
Die hantering van die Rumsfeld-saak en die weiering deur Duitsland om die beskuldigdes te vervolg, 
is belangrik omdat dit demonstreer dat die uitoefening van universele jurisdiksie oor internasionale 
misdade deur nasionale howe in ’n bepaalde staat beperk word deur die internasionaal erkende begin-
sels van subsidiariteit en die nie-inmenging in die belange en sake van ander state. Die struikelblokke 
wat hierdie twee beginsels meebring moet dus eers oorkom word alvorens sodanige strafregtelike ver-
volging suksesvol voor ’n vreemde gereg gevoer kan word. Dit laat die vraag onbeantwoord tot watter 
mate diplomatieke oorwegings en Realpolitik ’n rol speel in die uitkoms van sodanige sake. Die verloop 
van die tersake proses laat die indruk dat sodanige mooi klinkende internasionale beleidsdokumente 
nie sonder meer ’n waarborg bevat dat ’n vermeende oortreder van die daarin vervatte internasionale 
norme daadwerklik tot rekenskap gebring sal word voor iedere vreemde gereg nie.
